

Policing to Segregate: Sketching the Contours of an Eviction Regime in Suburban Los Angeles

Abstract

Using a case study of a Los Angeles suburb's reaction to Black movement through the federal Housing Choice Voucher program, I illustrate how white residents use policing to evict Black renters and re-assert racial segregation. This eviction regime consists of widespread hostility towards Black voucher renters, re-written municipal codes that incentivize participatory policing, and individuals engaging in policing by surveilling Black neighbors and dispatching police and city agencies to fine, arrest, or evict them. These findings compliment research focused on how integration is precluded by showing how it is reversed. They also suggest greater attention to the role of social context in shaping outcomes of mobility programs.

Introduction

Over fifty years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, the degree of Black-white residential segregation remains relatively high (Logan 2013). Explanations for the persistence of segregation focus on how public policy, institutional practices, and individual actions prevent Black households from moving to neighborhoods that may have significant rates of white residency (Charles 2003; Boustan 2011). This article seeks to intervene in the literature on segregation's persistence by examining how segregation is re-asserted once Black households move to a neighborhood with a significant white population. I present evidence that white residents engage in *participatory policing* by assuming functions traditionally associated with police as a means of removing Black neighbors and thereby reasserting segregation.

Because the structure of racial segregation has been so durable over time, to study how whites react to Black movement into neighborhoods they live in is to study a relatively rare occurrence. Yet there are strong reasons to focus on this reaction. First, while the rate of decline of racial segregation has been small over the past several decades, an important component of that decline can be attributed to Black movement to suburbs (Massey and Tannen 2017). More broadly, Lacy (2016) argues that the Black suburban experience remains relatively understudied. Second, based on the prediction that movement to middle class neighborhoods would improve the socio-economic outcomes of poor households, federal housing assistance to low-income renters has shifted its focus from the construction of public housing to the movement of the urban poor from segregated urban areas to less segregated and less disadvantaged neighborhoods through programs like the Moving to Opportunity demonstration and the Housing Choice Voucher program (Vale and Freemark 2012). To the extent that these policies create cases of Black movement to historically white neighborhoods, they make the reactions of white residents a salient issue (Covington, Freeman, and Stoll 2011).

I examine this issue through a case study of Black movement to the historically white region of Los Angeles known as the Antelope Valley, through the federal government's Housing Choice Voucher program. While Black residency in the valley traces back to the 1940s, it has accelerated since the Great Recession as the voucher program has incentivized its predominantly Black participants to move there. Drawing on interviews with 43 local residents in an Antelope Valley neighborhood experiencing high rates of voucher movement, I make three key findings.

First, consonant with literatures on racism, group threat, and opposition to welfare, I find widespread white hostility to Black movement. I show that this opposition is only nominally framed as opposition to the voucher program. Rather, it is rooted in a historical understanding of the valley as a white suburb and incorporates stereotypes based on race, class, and gender in order to further a narrative that legitimizes and even necessitates the policing and eviction of Black residents. The attitudes of local residents in response to voucher movement are an important part of understanding how the social context of reception affects the smaller than expected outcomes of anti-poverty programs premised on movement to middle class neighborhoods (Sampson 2008; Sharkey 2015).

Second, extending literature on the criminalization of poverty, I illustrate the ways that a re-structured local municipal code encourages local residents to engage in policing activities. By expanding the municipal codes and increasing fines and penalties (including eviction) for their violation, the city has created a pathway for a determined resident to evict his or her neighbor. The municipal codes structure and incentivize private action by individuals to police their neighbors, behavior which is superficially re-coded from racist to law-enforcing.

Third, linking criminalization, policing, and segregation, I show how a subset of local residents act on the attitudes found in the broader sample – through a phenomenon I call *participatory policing*. While some choose to leave the city or resign themselves to change, a significant fraction fight to re-assert control over their neighborhoods by policing Black voucher tenants. Their fight against Black voucher movement incorporates personal and communal surveillance of suspected voucher tenants, in-person confrontations, and residents’ deployment of agencies such as city code enforcement, the local housing authority, and the County Sheriff’s department who are expected to inspect, fine, intimidate, and ultimately evict voucher tenants. I claim that this participatory policing allows white residents to assert power over Black renters and push them out of the neighborhood through fines, social pressure, and evictions. To the degree that these tactics are successful, we see a case of policing being used to re-assert prior levels of racial segregation.

This case also suggests another mechanism by which segregation may be maintained. Communities opposed to racial integration may shift away from tools and tactics disfavored by fair housing jurisprudence and social norms, and towards tactics like policing that are more difficult to challenge legally and retain greater public support. More broadly, this case also adds to literature on the ways policing and segregation are intertwined. While scholarship focused on policing in central cities illustrates how policing takes advantage of segregation to apply disproportionate measures to minority groups, in this Los Angeles suburb, I suggest that policing is being used to re-create segregation.

Background

Persistent white resistance to racial integration

Rates of Black-white segregation have remained relatively high and declined slowly since the 1970s (Logan 2013; Massey and Rugh 2014; Massey and Tannen 2017). Among the many reasons for this is the persistence of white opposition to Black neighbors. First, whites tend to overestimate the size of minority groups and grow more hostile towards both Black people and policy seen as benefitting them as their share of the local population grows (Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz 2005; Pickett et al. 2012; Quillian 1996; Taylor 1998). Opposition to welfare policies is often rooted in ideas such as the culture of poverty and welfare abuse that encourage disgust for the poor, justify their status, and delegitimize government support (Hancock 2004; Lewis 1966; Seccombe 2007; Gilens 1999). Research on stated preferences shows that whites prefer to live in neighborhoods with less than 30% Black residency and would leave a neighborhood if more than one of three neighbors were Black (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Farley et al. 1978). Social institutions reproduce these attitudes in their structuring of the housing market. Real estate agents, property owners, and even renters seeking roommates steer and discriminate against Black renters and buyers (Boehm, Thistle, and Schlottmann 2006; Ghoshal and Gaddis 2015; Korver-Glenn 2018; Turner and Ross 2005; Williams, Nesiba, and McConnell 2005; Yinger 1995).

Opposition to prospective residential integration suggests that actual cases of Black movement to neighborhoods with white residents may also result in negative responses. In the past, white hostility extended to the imposition of “sundown” laws against any Black presence in white neighborhoods after sunset, and the creation and enforcement of racially restrictive covenants (Gotham 2000; Loewen 2005). White backlash also focused on stopping the construction of public housing and ending attempts to racially integrate educational institutions

(Bobo 1983; Delmont 2016; Green and Cowden 1992; Hirsch 2009; Sears and Kinder 1985; Sugrue 2014; Weatherford 1980). These attitudes also found their expression in physical violence. As Massey and Denton (1993) document, episodes of racial violence in early 1900s Chicago were located at the boundary lines where Black residents might cross over into traditionally white areas, a pattern repeated in the 1960s when whites responded to marches for fair housing with violence. More recent scholarship on Black movement into neighborhoods with substantial white populations suggests that active white backlash to Black movement has not ended. Rather, it takes three contemporary forms: political mobilization, violence, and policing.

First, in a long-term study of affordable housing construction in New York State after a court ruling mandating de-segregatory remedies to public housing siting, Massey et al. (2013) illustrate the suburban public's opposition to the placement of affordable housing units in their neighborhoods and their use of coded language to voice opposition to tenants on the basis of race. Enos' (2016) study of responses to the temporary relocation of public housing tenants in Chicago demonstrates that whites living in neighborhoods where Black people were relocated tended to increase their political participation through voter turnout in the election following such movement. This suggests political mobilization as a negative response to increased Black residency, and there is growing evidence that city governments respond to or reflect these attitudes by crafting policy that attempts to remove voucher tenants (Brown Hayat 2016; Ocen 2012).

Second, as Jeanine Bell (2013) documents, the use of physical violence to terrorize, halt, and reverse Black movement has persisted through recent decades and may in fact be acting as a replacement for tools of segregation rendered unavailable by law or social norms. Using an analysis of newspaper stories reporting on episodes of move-in violence, Bell finds 455 such incidents that took place between 1990 and 2010, noting that, "Frequently, the incidents directed at the integrating family occur within days, weeks, or a few months of their move to a predominantly or all-white neighborhood" (68).

Third, there is also evidence that individuals police members of proximate racial groups they may feel threatened by. Neighborhood conflict measured by complaints made to a city hotline is found to be more frequent at "fuzzy" neighborhood racial boundaries than at boundaries with informal but clear racial lines, suggesting the mobilization of the state as a defense against demographic change (Legewie and Schaeffer 2016). The deployment of various government agencies to regulate others is often referred to as third party policing and can also operate through pressure on rental property managers and landlords (Buerger and Mazerolle 1998; Desmond and Valdez 2012; Koehle 2013). Focusing on cases where policing intersects with race and housing assistance, research on whites' responses to living with former public housing tenants in a mixed-income redevelopment demonstrates that private renters in these buildings use a number of informal mechanisms to police building residents they believe are receiving government aid. Similarly, private renters and homeowners living near public housing redevelopments also display heightened animus towards those tenants and higher preferences for policing (Fraser et al. 2013; McCormick, Joseph, and Chaskin 2012).

Elaborating the relationship between policing and segregation

These cases suggest the importance of policing in maintaining racial domination in neighborhoods in the wake of civil rights legislation. Now that there are fewer mechanisms available to preclude the entry of Black and other minority groups into a given neighborhood, white residents may turn to policing as a means of asserting power over or removing those

residents. Public attention given to recent incidents of white residents calling police on Black residents engaged in everyday activities, as well as the rise of digital platforms for maintaining neighborhood social order (ie: NextDoor) suggest the broader salience of participatory policing.

I suggest that the relationship between policing and segregation works in two directions, one focused on policing racial groups within a given space, and the other focused on policing racial groups' access to space. In the first case, policing is relying on or taking advantage of patterns of racial segregation. For example, Rios (2011) documents how police are able to take advantage of the spatial concentration and isolation of Black and Latino boys and men in order to surveil, harass, enact violence upon, and incarcerate them. The extreme policing of Black and Latino men and women living in the inner city includes the persistent surveillance of members of these groups, itself a form of intimidation, stigmatization, and punishment that transforms the relationship between members of these groups and the state (Anderson 2013; Herbert 1997; Jones 2009; Rios 2011). Further, we see the rise of stop and frisk tactics, police sweeps, traffic stops, broken windows policing, and expansion of criminal and civil codes as other opportunities to surveil, police, and assert control. These tactics are increasingly seen not just in central cities but also in suburbs (Boyles 2015; Lowery 2016). Smith and Holmes (2014) illustrate that excessive force incidents are linked to the relative size of a minority population in a city as well as to the city's level of racial segregation. The authors conclude that these patterns of excessive force are legible within a framework of policing that sees minorities as a group threat. These processes reflect ongoing shifts from policy focused on poverty amelioration towards policing and punishment of the poor (Hinton 2016; Wacquant 2001). They may result not just in incarceration, but also in eviction (Desmond 2016; Hartman and Robinson 2003).

In the second case, policing is used to prevent access to space. Here, policing is working to create or entrench racial segregation. This type of relationship is exemplified by Muñiz's (2015) study of gang injunctions in Los Angeles. She documents how these injunctions are applied to members of a community based largely on racial stereotypes or racialized proxies for gang membership. Once included in the injunction, a person's rights are constrained and her liability for incarceration and punishment by the state increases dramatically. One adaption described by affected individuals is to temporarily or permanently leave the boundaries of the injunction, thereby lowering risk to themselves and their communities. The injunction, therefore, illustrates a case of policing advancing segregation by facilitating the removal of men of color from urban space through their targeted criminalization.

Setting

I study policing as a mechanism of segregation through a case study of one neighborhood experiencing high rates of Black movement through the Section 8 voucher program. This neighborhood is located in the City of Lancaster, in Los Angeles County's Antelope Valley suburb. The valley is over 60 miles north of Los Angeles' main cities, and serves as a destination for aspiring homeowners looking for affordable homes, for industries that cannot easily operate in the county, for elevated prison construction and incarceration-related employment, and, more recently, for low-income renters using the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program. Despite accounting for only 1.5% of the county's population, as of 2015, the City of Lancaster was home to 4.9% of the county's voucher tenants, or 9,109 individuals (The Department of Housing and Urban Development 2016). The high rate of voucher movement into Lancaster has occurred in the context of broader demographic changes in the city. While the proportion of Lancaster's

residents identifying as whites of any ethnicity remains high, at 64%, the population identifying as white alone has dropped from 85% in 1985 to just 33% in the 2015 American Community Survey, with non-whites and whites identifying as Hispanic taking their place in the city.

The Antelope Valley's employment and housing difficulties make it both a magnet for voucher openings and a poor destination for voucher movers. The average foreclosure rate in Lancaster's census tracts during the Great Recession was 10.2%, placing it among the top 3 cities hit by foreclosures in the Los Angeles / Long Beach metropolitan area (City of Lancaster 2009). It lost nearly 10% of its workforce during the recession, and its unemployment rate has remained higher than that of the City of Los Angeles ever since. As of 2013, average weekly wages and yearly salaries in the Antelope Valley were \$211 and \$4,050 less than in Los Angeles County, respectively (The Greater Antelope Valley Economic Alliance 2015). These disparities help explain why 71,000 people – fully 44.5% of the Valley's 159,615-person workforce – commute into Los Angeles proper for work (The Greater Antelope Valley Economic Alliance 2016). These trends also combine to form a favorable set of circumstances for voucher movement to the region. Landlords and property owners are known to sort voucher tenants, and those with high vacancies and low demand might see tenants with guaranteed rental support and few options as a solution to their problems (Rosen 2014). Landlord choice suggests one possible way that the foreclosure crisis changed the landscape of the voucher program (Pfeiffer and Lucio 2015). Recent data suggests that 76% of landlords in Los Angeles do not rent to voucher holders and that this estimate is higher in low-poverty areas and lower in high-poverty areas. (Cunningham et al. 2018). Landlord choices therefore distort the landscape of voucher usage and push tenants to less-preferred locations and units.

Using the City of Lancaster's 2008 Housing Needs Assessment, I selected a neighborhood reported to be high in voucher usage as a study area (City of Lancaster 2008). The population in the larger zip code area that contains this neighborhood grew by roughly 15,491 people between 2000 and 2014. Of that growth, 42% (just over 6,500 people) came from growth in the Black population. Between 2009 and 2015, the voucher population has grown from roughly 2000 tenants to roughly 2600 tenants, with a majority of these tenants also being Black. In that zip code, the median household income in 2015 was \$42,835, substantially less than the city's median income of \$49,057. Roughly 26.7% of individuals lived below the poverty level, and the Black poverty rate was even higher, at 34.5%. The same racial dichotomy exists in employment – in 2014 the white unemployment rate was 9.8%, while the Black unemployment rate was 18.9%. Additional demographic data about the field site's zip code is presented in Table 2. 77% of voucher tenants in Lancaster identify as Black (non-Hispanic) and 87% of voucher households there are headed by a woman. The median income in Lancaster's Section 8 households is \$14,317, far below the city's median household income of \$49,057.

With this context in mind, it is important to note that this case represents only one of a variety of study possibilities, each of which could contribute valuable knowledge to understanding the relationships between racial integration, attitudes, and policing. One alternative would be Black movement to white neighborhoods that is not driven by policies like the voucher program. Such a case would reduce the degree to which responses to that movement were shaped by views on public policy. Moreover, the specific vulnerabilities of voucher holders (a majority of whom are women) that accompany their program status – effectively a trade of privacy rights for housing aid – enable individuals and government entities to police them to a greater degree than otherwise might be possible (Bridges 2017; Gustafson 2011). Another scenario of note would be a case with a lower rate of movement than in the Antelope Valley.

Such a case may result in that movement being less noticed, or that movement not engendering a strong response. Other alternative scenarios could include Black movement to predominantly white neighborhoods of different economic circumstances, or white movement to Black neighborhoods. While examining the social interactions and use of policing in all of these alternative scenarios would increase the power to isolate causal mechanisms, this case can inform other instances of racial integration through federal housing policy and uncover social processes that may be present in the other categories of racial residential integration that I have outlined.

Table 1: Antelope Valley and Los Angeles County Populations

Methods and Data

This paper assesses the reaction to voucher movement by the local community through semi-structured interviews with 43 local residents in a deliberately chosen field site with high voucher usage in Lancaster, California. After selecting a neighborhood with a relatively high rate of voucher usage, I went door to door one street at a time soliciting interviews with adults who were not currently using the voucher program. I conducted these interviews during the summers of 2015 and 2016, and gained informed consent from roughly 1 in 5 households whose doors I knocked. Reasons for non-participation included no one being home, a home being vacant, an adult not being present, or a resident declining to participate. I attempted contact at each home only once. All names presented in this paper are pseudonyms.

A fifth of respondents were born in the Antelope Valley and among the rest, the average respondent had lived in the area for just over 20 years. Although many declined to provide employment information, the most common occupations disclosed were in construction, manufacturing, mechanical, aerospace, and education. Those not working said they were attending school, a stay-at-home parent, or in retirement. The demographic profile of the zip code in which these interviews were conducted is available in Table 2, and Table 3 provides limited data on the characteristics of respondents themselves.

The findings presented in this paper are limited in a number of important ways. First, many interviewees were skeptical of my intentions and motivations and therefore reluctant to provide baseline demographic information. This could be due to social desirability bias (Krumpal 2013), or a reluctance to be completely forthcoming with someone obviously not of the same race or social milieu. I chose to accommodate their concerns about providing personal information in order to increase survey participation and maintain trust with respondents. While this meant that data on respondent racial and ethnic identification, age, occupation, and other characteristics was incomplete, it also provided a more open interview environment for respondents and opened additional fruitful lines of inquiry that may not have been available otherwise. The lack of precise demographic data, however, limits the ability to precisely identify which respondents identify as white alone and which identify as Hispanic or Latino, and subsequently, whether opinions varied between these groups of my sample.

A second critical limitation of the data is that the racial and ethnic composition of respondents in the sample appears to be whiter than the composition of residents in the larger zip code in which interviews were conducted. Although data on the racial composition of respondents is very limited, as discussed above, my own subjective estimates of the racial makeup of the sample suggest that my sample is roughly 65% white, 14% Black, and 21%

Hispanic or Latino (demographic data about respondents is presented Table 3). Meanwhile the larger zip code containing this neighborhood is 67% white (of any ethnicity), 27% white only, 23% Black, and 46% Hispanic or Latino (of any race). This suggests some oversampling of white residents relative to the larger zip code area or miscoding due to the author error. One possible explanation for this phenomenon might be variation in areas of residency by race and ethnicity within the zip code in question, as my sample of homes was contained within several blocks. The relative lack of non-white Hispanic and Latino respondents limits the scope of the findings to the Black-white relationship in Lancaster. But the fact that respondents rarely discussed Hispanic or Latino residents and instead focused their hostility towards Black residents also suggests that the Black-white relationship is the most salient cleavage in the study area. Finally, residents who left the area (through white flight, for example), are not included in the sample. Differences between their characteristics, circumstances, and attitudes and those of residents who remain in this neighborhood cannot be measured or accounted for in this study.

Table 2: Demographic Data for Field Site's Zip Code

Table 3: Selected Characteristics of Respondents

Findings

In the following section I detail three phenomena which I argue constitute a suburban policing regime. First, I document widespread hostility towards Black voucher renters, which I argue constitutes a social basis for policing (n.b.: quotes here contain racist and sexist language). Second, I detail changes in municipal codes that encourage and incentivize participation in policing. Third, I illustrate how local residents engage in *participatory policing* through surveillance of presumed voucher tenants, information sharing about these individuals, and the dispatching of city, housing, and police agencies against them. These findings take a pyramid shape - the base of hostility is relatively large compared to the number of residents who report taking the most extreme forms of action.

A Social Basis for Policing

Group threat

While most respondents expressed in general terms their sense that their neighborhood had changed in negative ways over the past several years, a handful of residents explicitly framed these changes as a matter of negative racial change from an earlier, better time. Linda, one of the oldest respondents, conveyed this history as follows:

“Well, I can just tell you that for the first time a black family moved into this neighborhood, there went the neighborhood. And that was about 1988 I think...I think it was a law passed that there had to be a black family in every block...That started during the '60s. This was the NAACP. And they did it.”

Linda's narrative likely refers to her understanding of the Civil Rights Movement and its effects on segregation in the Antelope Valley. She and another respondent asserted that the area

had been a destination for people who sought to leave Los Angeles after the 1965 Watts uprising. A third respondent suggested that the government (abstractly construed) had an intentional strategy of “cleaning up” South Central by tearing down projects and moving tenants to the Antelope Valley using the voucher program. Regardless of their accuracy, these narratives serve as the context for how some respondents understood contemporary voucher movement and racial change in their neighborhoods, and were shared in different ways by many others. Eighteen (42%) used language that referenced invasion, threat, or racial change. And although voucher holders account for just over 5% of Lancaster’s population, fully 19 (44%) of respondents believed that fraction was over 50% and just 6 respondents (14%) estimated the voucher population as 25% or less of the total Lancaster population.

Despite these broad feelings of threat and invasion, less than half of respondents (20) said they knew any voucher tenants. Despite even fewer respondents claiming to have had substantive contact with voucher tenants, every respondent voiced some opinion about the program or its participants. When trying to understand how respondents formed opinions about voucher tenants with so little direct contact, it became clear that they were basing their assumptions on shorthand indicators of who might be using a voucher and ideas gleaned from observations of those individuals.

Stated methods of identifying presumed voucher tenants

When asked who in the neighborhood was using a voucher, or how one could tell who was using a voucher, 9 respondents (21%) used racial shorthand to suggest that race was a signal of voucher usage. Examples include “I never see anybody but African Americans getting Section 8,” or “I don't want to sound racist, but there's more black people [here].” Other quotes fitting this pattern are found in Table 4, and suggest that whether or not they were voucher tenants, all Black residents were subject to being considered a voucher holder by many of their neighbors. The common practice of referring to voucher tenants as Black worked to racialize a group defined by economic status while also “voucherizing” Black residents of the Antelope Valley who did not use the program. None of the respondents whose comments fit these categories later spoke of a difference between race and voucher status or indicated that they knew some number of their Black neighbors were not using vouchers. The common overestimates of the voucher population may be understandable not just in the context of racial threat, but also as products of a conflation of race and voucher status.

But in other cases, 9 respondents (21%) used indicators of social disorder (eg: abandoned cars, unmaintained property, loitering, homes in disrepair) to explain who they thought used a voucher (Sampson and Raudenbush 2004). Shirley, a middle-aged interviewee employed by the local school district, focused on daytime activity, “A lot of them I see just – every morning we leave and I see people just hanging out, sitting on their front porch not going to work. Just hanging out.” Helen, a former Caltrans employee who moved to Lancaster for more affordable housing after a workplace injury, based her identification on signs of poverty and uncleanness, saying, “You can just tell. They usually don't have a car. Their lawn really looks bad. Not just because of the drought. It's really dirty. It's a lot of trash.” These visual cues serve respondents as both a way to make classifications between voucher and non-voucher residents in their vicinity and as an indictment of voucher tenants and a validation of themselves (being clean, working, being able to afford a car). Marissa, a Black local resident, was aware of this reasoning and turned it on its head,

"I'm a house mom...I see what goes on in the area. I don't see young black kids and gang bangers walking up and down the street in the middle of the day. I see white people. So, I guess they're all Section 8 because they're not at work. I'm paying their rent. So that racist stuff – that annoys me. That white lady, she don't work. That means she's on Section 8. She's home all day. She's seeing everything. She must be on Section 8."

Though using observation to infer who in the neighborhood might be using a voucher was clearly a questionable tactic, as Marissa's comment demonstrates, the fact that nearly half of all respondents engaged in this behavior illustrates the pervasiveness of surveillance in neighborhood dynamics.

Table 4: Selected Quotes

Attitudes towards the program and tenants

Out of a total of 43 interviews, 29 (67%) included a significant expression of hostility towards the voucher program or voucher tenants, 8 (19%) could be characterized as maintaining a neutral stance despite some negativity, and just 6 (14%) were uniformly welcoming towards vouchers. Those who estimated the voucher population to be significantly higher than it was, or who used words and phrases indicating racial threat in their interviews also tended to express more overall hostility towards the program. 33% of those who made a small overestimation of the size of the voucher population had a negative view of the program, while 52% of those who made large overestimations of the voucher population had a negative view of the program. Although data on the racial makeup of the interview pool is based on author estimates, no differences were found between those respondents coded as white or coded as Hispanic or Latino.

Respondents were also offered a battery of statements to which they could assert agreement, neutrality, or dissent. 31 of 43 respondents participated in this portion of the interview, with the remaining 12 deviating from the formal interview plan due to the respondent's subject interests or time. As illustrated in Table 5, majorities agreed that voucher tenants abused the program and were lazy, and pluralities agreed that they brought problems to the neighborhood, committed crime at higher rates, and did not fit in. When it came to policy questions, a plurality wanted the government to stop the voucher program, while few tenants disagreed with the government taking additional steps to monitor voucher tenants. In total, between those who responded affirmatively to a question about their support for monitoring and those who made comments in other parts of the interview endorsing or admitting to engaging in some form of active monitoring, 22 (51%) of respondents could be considered supportive of some form of surveillance of voucher tenants. In their interviews, significant numbers of respondents went further than expressing general opposition to the program, and revealed racial, gendered, and economic resentments that served as a basis for further action.

Table 5: Responses to Opinion Statements

A tangle of prejudices

In keeping with the pattern that many respondents assumed that their Black neighbors were voucher tenants, 14 respondents (33%) made comments about voucher tenants that employed negative racial stereotypes. The subjects of these comments included sexual behavior, laziness, intentional attempts to gain government benefits, crime, and drug use. The extended comments by Michael, a middle-aged man in the real estate business, illustrate how attitudes about the voucher program were intertwined with ideas about race, gender, sexuality, and culture:

“Michael: “...it's not the Section 8 woman that lives there. That's fine and all that. But it's all the fucking riff-raff they bring with them. All the 98's that come up here from LA and hang out in the yard and fucking barbecue, couches, all that shit in the front yard.

Author: - What's a 98?

Michael: Ninety-eight is security code for blacks...it's not like saying black. You know what I mean?...It's a neutral term.

Author: So you're saying that the tenants can be good but there's other people that come in with them –

Michael: Tenants can be okay, like it's just the momma and the little couple of kids or whatever, that's fine. But that's not what you get. You get all the cousins staying overnight, you get the drug dealing, all the bullshit. I've seen them. Go down to the Section fucking 8 office and watch them...Watch it. Watch what happens. You can see them all. They're all the same size. They all eat the same. Go ahead.

Author: And this is based on your personal experience –

Michael: It is the fucking reality! My experience is reality.”

Although Michael proved to be an outlier in terms of the sheer number of racial stereotypes verbalized in one interview, roughly one in three interviewees made comments about the voucher program or tenants that included one or more racial stereotype, and many became similarly agitated when voicing their frustrations. In his interview, Michael repeatedly spoke about voucher tenants assuming they were Black. But his opinion of the voucher program was also bound up with his views of Black women. In order, he cited Black women's' living arrangements, Black visibility (the front lawn comment), and stereotypes about drugs and criminality. Later, Michael issued similar comments about Black cooking and dietary practices, asserted that Black voucher tenants are “professional” welfare recipients, and claimed that voucher holders (who he assumes are Black women) simply “wait about four years and then

squeak out another one, so they can always stay on the program.” His comments exemplify the racial stereotypes and obsessive monitoring of Black women in the Antelope Valley. His views were echoed by 6 other respondents who commented on voucher tenants’ sexual practices, number of partners, parenting practices, and manipulation of pregnancy or disability to qualify for welfare or housing support.

Finally, economic resentments motivated hostility towards vouchers among 16 respondents (37%). Some expressed concern that tenants themselves did not genuinely need the voucher program and were abusing the system. Susan, a widow, exemplified this common suspicion, explaining, “Oh, there some that need it in the worst way and that's ones that I would like to see get it...But we have it just taken advantage of. They live on it.” In many cases, respondents appended to these comparisons a divination of the attitudes of voucher tenants. One example included a resident adding, “They're just kinda – I don't know. They feel entitled I think.” Declarations about the attitudes, morals, or values of voucher tenants were common – as seen in Table 5, 58% of respondents agreed with the statement “voucher tenants are lazy.”

But while comments about program abuse were common, respondents also resented the program based on comparisons between their own lives and those of voucher tenants. Dorothy, an elderly widow who moved to Lancaster in the late 1950s, drew a common comparison:

“I'm here fifty-ish years, tried to make [a] home and how do you think I feel when I see some of these people that their Humvee's sitting in their yard and not in their garage at the Section 8 houses over there, and [paying] \$300.00 - \$400.00 for a \$2,500.00 a month house? To me, that is a problem.”

Dorothy’s resentment was based on a perception that voucher holders received a level of support that made their lives easier than hers. She stated her belief that voucher holders were intentionally leaving their expensive cars outside, rather than in the garage – suggesting that they were flaunting their means and that her having to see these cars regularly was an affront. Later, Dorothy made the comparison more explicit, stating, “They're living in better houses than we are,” while Ashley, a young mother, explained that she was upset “because when you see someone who's able to buy a lobster because they don't have to pay rent...I don't get lobster.” Craig, a respondent who had trouble keeping steady construction work, explained that landlords would prefer a voucher renter to him because a majority of their rent was guaranteed and his shaky employment made him a risk of not paying on time or fulfilling his lease. Echoing Hochschild (2016), these findings suggest that some respondents saw their own economic positions as roughly equal to those of voucher tenants and were not just judging voucher holders’ deservingness, but also resenting the perception that they as local residents were not receiving equal help.

Vouchers and social disorder

Watching the actions of those who they believed to be on vouchers drove the formation of negative attitudes among 15 (35%) of respondents. That voucher tenants were not conforming on their own to expectations and norms of local residents was a significant source of agitation for respondents. Aggravations included noise, dirtiness, and a myriad of indicators of social activity and leisure.

Noise from voucher tenants (or their children) was cited as a frustration by 10 respondents (23%). Respondents complained of neighbors arguing, playing music too loudly, making too much noise when returning home at night, or their children playing too loudly in the yard or street. Similarly, 9 (21%) of respondents, expressed hostility to the voucher program or its tenants based on their lack of cleanliness. This was primarily assessed from the exterior of the house, but also included inferences about the interiors as well (despite no respondent indicating having been inside of a voucher tenant's home).

In a similar fashion, many respondents made comments that indicated their displeasure at what they saw as indicators of tenant excesses. Eight interviewees (19%) were aggrieved by the presence of additional cars, or the parking of additional cars in front of other homes. One respondent explained, "Yes, it's affecting me...I like all the people on the neighbor's side fine – but I think that that's a [voucher] family right there. That car is not supposed to be there. That bothers me." The presence of additional cars was read as a sign that voucher tenants were socializing when, as a beneficiary of government support, they should have a more ascetic lifestyle. Similarly, complaints about lights being on at night, or other indicators of being awake and active at late hours, were issues of agitation for several respondents.

The examples demonstrate the circular logic of first identifying voucher tenants as whoever is noisy or dirty and then criticizing the program because the people presumed to be on it were noisy or dirty. But they also demonstrate how everyday issues between neighbors can be read as an indicator of the character of voucher tenants. Actions interpreted as evidence of living an ascetic lifestyle demonstrated to local residents that voucher tenants truly deserved and appreciated their support, but actions subjectively interpreted as having fun, being lazy, not working, staying up late, or having too nice a car meant abuse of the program, and by extension, abuse of themselves as taxpayers. In many interviews, respondents provided answers that conveyed frustration about their inability to exert control over the neighborhood, to stop changes, or to make voucher tenants behave in ways they wish. These frustrations are the basis for a policing regime carried out by a minority of residents in the neighborhood.

Constructing a Suburban Policing Regime

The local respondents detailed above find a productive outlet for their frustrations through participation in the structure of policing created by the local government. Beginning in roughly 2008, the city government in Lancaster explored and attempted a variety of measures to reduce, undo, and exert control over voucher movement to the city. Detailed in court filings by individuals and groups affected by the policies as well as settlement agreements ending some practices, the city is alleged to have worked with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's department to create a policing program directed at the predominantly Black voucher renting population, attempted to cap rentals to voucher tenants, and explored ways to discourage voucher tenants from moving to the city. While some of these measures were effective and others were not, perhaps the most effective strategy has been the city's revision of its municipal codes and adoption of a nuisance ordinance. The nuisance ordinance is alleged to have originated "[a]fter Lancaster's mayor specifically asked the City Council to —[l]ook into a means for making it very easy for neighbors to file nuisance lawsuits with the assistance of the City against...Section 8 housing." The resulting ordinance defined a nuisance as: "[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or is an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or

neighborhood, or by any considerable number of persons.” The ordinance also provided “enhanced penalties where there are multiple calls to the police or public safety entities for service – even where there is no actual criminal activity” (The Community Action League et al. v. City of Lancaster and City of Palmdale 2011). Crucially, penalties falling on landlords could be avoided entirely by those landlords evicting the renter who was subject to the complaints. In addition to this change, in 2015 the city also revised its municipal codes to expand fineable offenses, grant law enforcement the power to issue code violation fines, and increase the financial penalties for violations (City of Lancaster 2015). Ocen (2012) refers to legal changes like these as a new type of racially restrictive covenant that, as Hayat (2016) describes, operates superficially through voucher status rather than race.

As the city government attempted various tactics to push back against voucher movement, local residents were also reacting in a variety of ways. Some engaged in white flight, selling their homes or moving to a nearby city and renting out their original properties. Although I do not have an estimate of the size of this population, several local residents I spoke to referenced neighbors who had left and stated that they too hoped to leave the city in the future. 16 respondents (37%) resigned themselves to unwanted change or took steps to isolate or protect themselves by leaving the house less often or building fences and security systems for their properties. Finally, 22 (51%) local residents I spoke to supported or engaged in at least one action that could be coded as a form of *participatory policing*. These include surveilling neighbors they believed held vouchers, sharing information about suspected voucher tenants with other local residents, filing a complaint with a municipal, housing, or police authority, or directly confronting a voucher tenant. Because the revision of municipal codes had opened space for individual complaints, it incentivized individual participation in the policing of voucher tenants and empowered residents to take the law into their own hands. If violations of nuisance codes would lead to fines and possible eviction, then local residents opposed to the presence of Black voucher renters had a strong reason to watch their neighbors and file complaints. Widespread hostility towards the voucher program and its Black residents now had an avenue of expression through policing.

Participatory Policing

Surveillance and diffusion

A small number of local residents actively investigated which of their neighbors might be using a voucher, but by sharing this information with neighbors either informally or through the neighborhood watch, they effectively expanded the effects of surveillance much farther. These activities helped some residents reassert a feeling of control over their surroundings and laid the groundwork for further policing.

In multiple cases, respondents I interviewed at their front doors would point out the homes on their block which they knew were rented to Section 8 tenants and describe something about the tenants who lived there – whether they were noisy, how recently they had moved in, why a rental unit might be vacant, and so on. Jim, a retiree who had moved to Lancaster after leaving the Navy in the mid 1970s, explained in detail the various strategies he employed to identify voucher tenants:

“Author: And how do you know when a house is Section 8?”

Jim: How do I know? First place, I know every owner of every house in this block and I've got their number. And when someone rents a house and moves in, I ask them.

Author: Okay. You ask the renter or the –

Jim: I ask the owner. Is this Section 8 or are you just renting it out?

Author: Oh, okay.

Jim: And you can always go to the courthouse and find out if it's a Section 8 rental or not.”

Jim later explained that he not only worked hard to know when and where voucher tenants were living in his neighborhood, but that he actively worked to organize his community to be aware of and assist in monitoring these tenants. This type of information sharing was not uncommon. Russell, a retired-by-layoff former aerospace employee who had been transferred to Lancaster by his former employer in the 1990s, explained how he benefitted from these surveillance networks:

“Russell: ...We have a neighborhood watch here, one guy, and he always knows what's going on all hours of the night.

Author: Oh, okay. So he kind of keeps an eye on things?

Russell: Yeah. Makes the complaints.”

Russell did not need to go to the same lengths as Jim to discover voucher renters because he actively benefitted from one of his neighbor's efforts to collect that information and share it amongst local residents. In this way, residents like Jim had an outsized effect on the neighborhood, as their information diffused through networks such as pre-existing friendships between long-time residents or organizations like the neighborhood watch. These networks provided Russell with enough information to allow him to stand at his doorway and point out the homes within eyesight he claimed to know were rented by voucher tenants – adding the tidbits of information he knew about the renters as well.

In some cases, this surveillance and coordination operated through the local neighborhood watch. Four respondents (9%) spoke openly about this program, which served as both an information exchange and a tool of intimidation. Jim explained that that symbolic function, by saying “I'll do anything I can to keep the signs up because that's a good preventative.” Although he was frustrated by the scope of territory that required surveillance and disappointed that public participation was inconsistent, he remained adamant about doing his part, saying “I walk my block once a day or twice a day,” and added that he would always watch the houses of those who made a good effort to participate in the neighborhood watch. In an interview conducted down the street, another respondent referenced him as a source of information about voucher tenants, an active monitor of the block, and a person who could be relied upon to call the Sheriff's department or city's code enforcement office. Another older resident on a different block expressed thanks for the good people on her street that monitored the “comings and goings,” again suggesting that while only some residents engaged in very active surveillance efforts, their work had wide effects and was appreciated by others. Thus, this case now includes 1) a base of residents who are hostile to the voucher program, 2) a legal scaffolding that incentivizes surveillance and reporting, and 3) a response mechanism whose

outcomes include eviction of a mostly Black voucher population. Participating in surveillance and reporting of voucher tenants' infractions furthers the goal of removing them from the neighborhood.

Dispatching police and city agencies

Local residents did not engage in surveillance simply to know who was using a voucher. Rather, this surveillance was a necessary component of efforts to assert control over and police their surroundings. By watching supposed voucher homes, local residents could then call the local office of the Los Angeles County Housing Authority (which could investigate or evict voucher holders for violation of program rules), the city's code enforcement hotline (which could investigate or fine the property owners renting to voucher holders for violating city rules), and the police (who could make arrests and issue citations). Even if no formal punishment occurred, the inspection or police visit itself was a form of punishment for the tenant and could also function to intimidate them. Deploying these agencies constituted an important part of fighting back against vouchers and provided a sense of agency to local residents. According to Russell, the motivation to make these calls was the promise of evicting unwanted neighbors: "Yeah, well I heard someone tell me that if you rent to someone and there's five complaints about them then they're evicted and you can't rent no more." Russell's version was near the truth – in response to voucher movement, the municipal code had been changed to mandate that if a rental unit was the subject of five nuisance complaints in one year, both the tenant and the landlord would be subject to fines and other penalties, which the landlord could avoid by evicting the tenant (The Community Action League et al. v. City of Lancaster and City of Palmdale 2011). Knowledge about these types of policies was exchanged both verbally as well as on popular online message boards.

Just 5 respondents (10%) offered that they made these calls, but they indicated that they made the calls in high volume and often on behalf of others on their block. Jim spoke with pride about the power afforded to him by this dynamic, "I got the Section 8 people thrown out because I was calling Code Enforcement every day. Every day Code Enforcement was over at that Section 8 house." Later in his interview he detailed one incident in which he called the code enforcement hotline to inform the city that a neighbor had violated housing code when fixing part of her home. The tenant begged him not to file a complaint but he said he did so anyways, to send a message to others that violations would not be tolerated. When confronted by his peers about his harshness, he recounted saying, "Take your neighborhood watch and shove it. Next time you see somebody messing with your mailbox, call a sheriff. Don't call me to call the sheriff." Here, Jim revealed his role as the local resident who made complaints on behalf of many of his neighbors, and illustrated that these calls were made to both code enforcement and police. When other respondents said they were glad someone was making complaints or that they knew someone was keeping an eye on things, they were likely referring to people like Jim.

Finally, not all policing occurred through government channels. Nine respondents (20%) indicated that they had confronted a voucher tenant. These confrontations ranged from incidents in which a local resident told a voucher tenant to change their behavior to verbal arguments or threats of violence. One respondent recounted an instance in which he threatened children of a voucher user violence. Jim boasted of carrying a weapon and once using it. Notably, he said that the police had asked him to stop, but he simply switched to walking with a cane, which he called a legal way to carry a weapon. I witnessed a man chase and berate a young Black boy riding a

bicycle down the sidewalk in front of his home. These episodes suggest the everyday ways that local residents policed their neighbors and illuminate the difficult conditions voucher tenants live under.

These reports of policing behaviors suggest that Black voucher holders and Black renters presumed to be voucher holders are experiencing surveillance, inspections, and other forms of policing on a significant scale. One indicator of this is that during the last five years, code enforcement has become a more significant public function in Lancaster. Although more specific data is not available, the city's code enforcement revenue jumped from \$10,000 to \$130,000 between 2004 and 2014 (City of Lancaster n.d.). And although it ceased making this information available in subsequent years, in 2008-2009 the city boasted of opening 22,000 code enforcement investigations (13 investigations per 100 city residents) which led to 12,000 violation notices and 3,600 citations. In related research, I find evidence that Black voucher tenants experience policing and surveillance, and adapt to this hostile climate by curtailing their public visibility and social lives in order to minimize the chances of drawing scrutiny and possible fines and evictions (Kurwa 2015, 2018).

Discussion

In the years since the passage of the Fair Housing Act, legal, social, and political changes have restricted the range of actions that can be taken to legally bar or remove households from neighborhoods on the basis of race. However, research on stated and revealed preferences continue to suggest widespread anti-Black racism in housing markets. While social science research provides a thorough account of how Black movement to neighborhoods with substantial white populations is precluded, this case suggests that policing is a mechanism by which Black movement is reversed once it occurs. Specifically, the actions described by respondents in this study suggest that widespread hostility and a legal framework that encourages participation in policing constitute an environment in which individuals may engage in policing behaviors in order to remove Black voucher renters and in so doing reverse racial integration. Further, the power to deploy forces that can fine or evict a voucher tenant elevates those who can use that power to a state of authority over those they police. That unequal relationship is exacerbated by the reality that voucher tenants have fewer privacy rights than private renters, and that a tactic that relies on the criminalization of voucher renters is all the stronger for its raced and gendered aspects. Finally, this case also helps flesh out the two-way street between policing and segregation. Rather than taking advantage of patterns of racial segregation, policing can also work to produce and reproduce segregation. Similarly, fines based on violations of municipal codes shift from being an extractive tool of city government to a tool of punishment and eviction, and eviction shifts from an outcome determined by landlords and used to further rental profits to one driven by neighbors to further racial segregation.

To the degree that these dynamics are present in other settings, this case may have significant implications for theory and policy on segregation. Because the data emerge from a case of Black movement specifically through the Housing Choice Voucher program, the reaction to that movement also speaks to the fate and logic of that program. Proponents of residential mobility as an anti-poverty strategy expected that by moving from a poor to a less poor neighborhood, poor households may see socio-economic progress over time because they are no longer exposed to an array of neighborhood disadvantages and are will enjoy the advantages of a

new neighborhood. But if the social context of reception that greets these movers is one of hostility, and local residents simply refuse to welcome these movers, then the expectations underlying residential mobility are broken. That would suggest that a hostile social context of reception is an important issue to consider when evaluating the outcome of residential mobility programs aimed at reducing poverty. When we consider implications for the Moving to Opportunity experiment, we should remember that so-called opportunity neighborhoods are often so because of the structure of racial residential inequality, that mobility programs threaten those privileges, and that beneficiaries of the status quo have always reacted to protect them.

Much more could be known about this case and others in order to test these conclusions and their applicability. Focusing on this study, although there is evidence that the practices described in this article escalated evictions of voucher renters in the Antelope Valley, further data about the frequency and rate of nuisance calls and their spatial and temporal relationship to Black movement in the Antelope Valley would help quantify the scale and effects of this phenomenon. More research on the views and actions of Hispanic and Latino residents would also be helpful. More broadly, comparison cases of reactions to Black movement in other settings and at different levels of intensity, with and without the voucher program's involvement, would also lend clarity. And comparisons of the effects of nuisance code adoption (along with other similar municipal codes) in other cities would also lend clarity to our understanding of their role in racial segregation and inequality (Center for Public Health Law Research 2018).

These caveats aside, I argue that the local response to Black voucher movement in the Antelope Valley reflects Kenneth Clark's (1965) warnings about the limitations of residential mobility:

“Suburban communities can only be temporary havens for whites who desire racial homogeneity...It would indeed be a pathetic repetition of social, economic, and political folly if whites respond by techniques of exclusion that “worked” in the past, by developing suburban ghettos. But such a routine, unimaginative, and fearful response is all too likely – people tend to follow familiar patterns of behavior unless interrupted (Clark 1965:61-62).”

Although the Antelope Valley was historically just such a white haven within the greater Los Angeles area, as Clark predicted, that status has proven temporary. Here, at least, massive resistance has given way to participatory policing as a means of maintaining the old status quo.

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| Table 1: Voucher and Overall Population Summary Counts, Antelope Valley and Los Angeles County, 2016 | |
|--|------------|
| <i>Lancaster</i> | |
| Voucher Population | 9,109 |
| Total Population | 161,103 |
| Percent of Population Using a Voucher | 5.65% |
| <i>Palmdale</i> | |
| Palmdale Voucher Population | 5,722 |
| Palmdale Total Population | 158,351 |
| Percent of Palmdale Residents Using a Voucher | 3.61% |
| <i>Antelope Valley</i> | |
| Voucher Population | 14,398 |
| Total Population | 319,454 |
| Percent of Residents Using a Voucher | 4.51% |
| <i>Los Angeles County</i> | |
| Voucher Population | 184,533 |
| Total Population | 10,170,292 |
| Percent of Residents Using a Voucher | 1.81% |
| | |
| Percent of Los Angeles Population Living in Antelope Valley | 3.14% |
| Percent of Los Angeles Voucher Population Living in Antelope Valley | 7.80% |
| <i>Source: US Census and Department of Housing and Urban Development figures. Data excludes incomplete voucher and population information from the Census designated places Littlerock, Sun Valley, and Quartz Hill.</i> | |

| Table 2: Demographic Data for Zip Code 93535 in the City of Lancaster (2012-2016 American Community Survey Estimates) | | |
|--|--|----------|
| <i>Population</i> | | |
| | Census 2000 Total Population | 57,791 |
| | 2016 ACS 5-Year Population Estimate | 73,948 |
| <i>Age</i> | | |
| | Median Age | 29.6 |
| <i>Education</i> | | |
| | Percent high school graduate or higher | 76.70% |
| | Percent bachelor's degree or higher | 9.90% |
| <i>Housing and Income</i> | | |
| | Total housing units | 21,098 |
| | Median Household Income | \$42,266 |
| | Individuals below poverty level | 30.208% |
| <i>Race and Hispanic Origin</i> | | |
| | White (of any ethnicity) | 67.60% |
| | White alone | 27.60% |
| | Black or African American alone | 23.00% |
| | Hispanic or Latino (of any race) | 46.20% |
| <i>Source: American Community Survey, 2016 Estimates</i> | | |

| Table 3: Selected Demographic Data for Local Resident Respondents | | |
|---|---|-----|
| <i>Gender</i> | | |
| | Female | 51% |
| | Male | 49% |
| <i>Race/Ethnicity*</i> | | |
| | White | 65% |
| | Black | 14% |
| | Hispanic or Latino | 21% |
| <i>Occupation</i> | | |
| | Construction, Manufacturing, or Maintenance | 21% |
| | Health Care | 9% |
| | Education | 9% |
| | Aerospace | 7% |
| | Unemployed | 12% |
| | Retired | 12% |
| | Other or Unknown | 30% |
| <i>Total</i> | | 43 |
| <i>*Rough estimates based on incomplete reports by respondents and author's observation. Should be treated as suggestive, but not definitive.</i> | | |

| Table 4: Selected Quotes | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Background Story | |
| Group Threat | <i>"Oh they cleaned up L.A. Not the whole – I mean you go to South-Central it's still South Central, but...there was sections that they moved up here...they tore down their projects and they moved them up here into Section 8 housing and then they tore down the projects and they build condos."</i> |
| Identifying Voucher Tenants | |
| Race | <i>"I would say a racist comment on that, just saying what I've noticed it looks like there's more African-American getting it more than anything else, but I think, like I said, it just comes into the being lazy part at the same time."</i> |
| Social Disorder | <i>"You can just tell. They usually don't have a car. Their lawn really looks bad. Not just because of the drought. It's really dirty. It's a lot of trash."</i> |
| Attitudes Towards Tenants | |
| Racial Stereotypes | <i>"With the kids, these – I don't want to bring race into it, but certain racial entities have a lot of kids and they do it because welfare, Section 8, give them everything free."</i> |
| Gendered Stereotypes | <i>"If a woman gets pregnant and has a child she has everything paid for. Her boyfriend lives in the house. They get free house. Free rent. If she goes to college they get more money, and they have another child, more money and they get this, that and the other."</i> |
| Economic Resentment | <i>"It's like my friend goes and gets her welfare check and she sees people pulling up in their Escalades to go collect bills"</i> |
| Agitations | |
| Noise | <i>"...you have a lot of noise at night, people not letting you sleep because, again, some of them don't work and they're up all night, sleeping all day, when you want to be sleeping 'cause you work."</i> |
| Cleanliness | <i>"I know people here that lives in Section 8. I don't like the way that – I try to keep my house clean and organized, and then the backyard as well, and you can see through your backyard to the neighbors, how they live, is not clean. That bothers me a lot."</i> |
| Social Activity | <i>"They always seem to have a lot of traffic in and out. Not a good thing."</i> |
| Policing | |
| Monitoring | <i>"I believe that a neighborhood watch captain can only be effective for the area that he can physically see here, like a block...I walk my block once a day or twice a day."</i> |
| Code Enforcement | <i>"I got the Section 8 people thrown out because I was calling Code Enforcement every day."</i> |
| Calling the Police | <i>"When we got R. Rex Parris in office that was the change up time because he stood up to the mongrels. He stands up for what he believes – he's against Section 8 himself and bottom line is he's got the Sheriff's department working with him where – I got a Deputy Sheriff on speed dial on my phone. I call him every time I've got a problem on the block. I don't put up with no crap."</i> |

Table 5: Characteristics of Interviews

| Characteristic | | Number and Percent of Respondents | | Characteristic | | Number and Percent of Respondents | | |
|--|--|--|-----|--|--|--|--|-----|
| Sense of Group Threat | Used words or phrases suggesting a sense of threat | 18 | 42% | Responses to Opinion Statements (N=31) | Voucher Tenants are Lazy | 18 | 58% | |
| | Identifying Presumed Voucher Holders | Used racial shorthand to identify vouchers | 9 | | 21% | Voucher Tenants Commit More Crime | 14 | 45% |
| Used indicators of disorder to identify vouchers | | 9 | 21% | | Voucher Tenants Don't Fit In | 11 | 35% | |
| Attitude towards Voucher Tenants | Welcoming towards vouchers | 6 | 14% | | Voucher Tenants Abuse the System | 16 | 52% | |
| | Generally neutral towards vouchers | 8 | 19% | | Voucher Tenants Bring Problems | 12 | 39% | |
| | Generally hostile towards vouchers | 29 | 67% | | Stop Sending Voucher Tenants Here | 9 | 29% | |
| | Voiced negative racial stereotypes | 14 | 33% | | Responses to Black Voucher Movement | Expressed powerlessness | 16 | 37% |
| | Voiced negative gender stereotype | 7 | 16% | | | Negative opinion tied to observation | 15 | 35% |
| | Voiced economic resentment | 16 | 37% | | | Supportive of or engaged in monitoring | 22 | 51% |
| | Social Disorder | Cited noise | 10 | | | 23% | Shared information about vouchers with neighbors | 4 |
| Cited cleanliness | | 9 | 21% | Volunteered that they called police or city agencies | 5 | 12% | | |
| Cited cars | | 8 | 19% | Had a confrontation with a voucher tenant | 9 | 21% | | |